Wednesday, May 24, 2017

From PrimeKey Tech Days 2016: How to be ready for tomorrow’s quantum attacks Vladimir Soukharev

By VladimirSoukharev, Ph.D. Cryptographer at InfoSec Global Group


Wednesday, April 19, 2017

DNS CAA to be Mandatory from September 2017

The Vote

Back in March, the CA/Browser Forum (CABForum) held a vote for Ballot 187 - Make CAA Checking Mandatory. The vote passed with a resounding 19 out of 21 CAs voting 'yes' (one 'no' and one 'abstain') and all three participating browsers in favor [1]. The practical result of this is that starting September 8th of 2017 it will become mandatory for CAs to consult CAA records before issuing certificates. [2]

The Current State of the PKI Ecosystem  

A commonly lifted obstacle in PKI infrastructure is the issue of the Web of Trust. Through the years we've seen on several occasions how that trust can be violated, i.e when a CA goes rogue, becomes compromised, or fails to follow its own regulations. This was illustrated back in 2011 by the infamous breaches of the Comodo and DigiNotar certificate authorities where both CAs issued wildcard certificates for several high profile domains, or just this year when Google Chrome downgraded certificates issued by Symantec due them to issuing test certificates to Google domains without Google's knowledge. [3]

Several combined efforts have been made to solve the inherent vulnerabilities to this system. So far, no single solution is all encompassing, and even the overlap of every solution proposed doesn't create a foolproof system. Certificate Transparency [4] is one such effort, and has been been supported by EJBCA Enterprise since EJBCA 6.0.4, released in early 2014. [5]

So what is DNS CAA?

DNS Certificate Authority Authorization is defined in RFC 6488 [6] and defines a requirement for CAs to make a pre-issuance check, according to the certificate policy set, with a record stored at the DNS of the affected domain. Any CA without authorization from the DNS will be warned not to issue a certificate. 

Essentially, it allows the end client to restrict which CA's they consider trustworthy, and since the vote at CABForum, this implies any CA not enforcing CAA. While this does not guard against CAs going rogue (by ignoring CAA), it allows domain owners to restrict issuance to CAs whose security and policies they trust, and to exclude less trustworthy (but still CAA enforcing) CAs from the web of trust. 

How does this affect EJBCA?

Here at PrimeKey we more than welcome any efforts to improve the state of the PKI ecosystem, so naturally we were delighted to see the results of the vote at CABForum. While CAA hasn't been a priority for us until now (due to little demand), we've moved up our roadmap. Thus we've slated CAA for EJBCA 6.9.0, which will be released to by August 4th 2017, a month before CAA becomes mandatory. CAA will be an Enterprise feature only

On behalf of the EJBCA Development Team, 
Mike Agrenius Kushner,
Product Owner EJBCA

[1] https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2017-March/009988.html
[2] https://cabforum.org/2017/03/08/ballot-187-make-caa-checking-mandatory/
[3] https://arstechnica.com/security/2017/03/google-takes-symantec-to-the-woodshed-for-mis-issuing-30000-https-certs/
[4] https://www.certificate-transparency.org/
[5] http://blog.ejbca.org/2014/06/certificate-transparency-with-ejbca.html
[6] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844

Wednesday, May 18, 2016

What does eIDAS compliance mean for a PKI?

The new eIDAS regulation that has been adopted in the EU (by 1 July 2016) comes with a new set of standard documents from ETSI, specifying particular requirements on PKI. The two new eIDAS standards relevant for PKI are:
  • EN 319 411 - Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates
  • EN 319 412 - Certificate Profiles
The standards are maintained by the standardization body ETSI and can be downloaded from the ETSI download area.

What new requirements do these standards come with? Looking closely there are only two new things needed to be able to claim "eIDAS compliance":
  • A new DN attribute organizationIdentifier
  • New fields in the QCStatement certificate extension
Let's dig a little deeper into these two requirements.

OrganizationIdentifier

OrganizationIdentifier is a DN attribute with OID 2.5.4.97 specified in X.520. This is an attribute that has, to my knowledge, never been in common use in certificates before. Its usage in the eIDAS context is described in the following sections of EN 319 412:
  • EN 319 412-1 section 5.1.1 and 5.1.4
  • EN 319 412-2 section 4.2.3.1 and 4.2.4
  • EN 319 412-3 section 4.2.1
OrganizationIdentifier is supported in EJBCA Enterprise PKI from version 6.5.2.

QCStatement

There is already a QCStatement extension in use since long. With the new standards comes a few additions.

The new items in the QCStatement extension are:
  • QcType, claiming that the certificate is a EU qualified certificate of a particular type
  • PdsLocation, location of PKI Disclosure Statements (PDS)
The QCStatement is described in:
  • EN 319 411-2 section 6.6.1
  • EN 319 412-1 section 5.1.1 and 5.1.2
  • EN 319 412-2 section 5.1 and 5.2
  • EN 319 412-4 section 4.2
  • EN 319 412-5, full technical description
With the convenient ability to define custom extensions in the EJBCA GUI (since EJBCA 6.4.0) the new QCStatement extension can be easily added to any certificate profile.

EJBCA Enterprise

We strive to support all relevant open PKI standards and it is important to keep EJBCA Enterprise up to date with new and emerging standards. Since EJBCA 6.5.2 eIDAS compliance should be easily achieved on the level of PKI.

More information  

Basic information on EJBCA Enterprise PKI and PKI Appliance developed by PrimeKey.
EJBCA is a registered trademark of PrimeKey Solutions AB in the EU, the United States, Japan and certain other countries.

Wednesday, April 13, 2016

USB 3.1 Certificate Authentication with EJBCA

A USB standard for authentication of devices has been released a little while ago [1] as part of USB 3.1.

In short, the standard specifies the use of:
  • X509v3, DER encoding certificates 
  • ECDSA using the NIST P256 (a.k.a. secp256r1) curve, uncompressed point format 
  • SHA256 
SubjectDN fields should be:
  • CN: USB:<vendor ID>:<product ID>
  • O: organization name attribute shall contain the human-readable name of the organization that owns the private key 
  • DN Serial Number: lowercase hex-encoded value of the binary data (e.g. wafer number, lot number, production lot, etc.) necessary for uniqueness. 
In addition, there is one new certificate extension:

Custom certificate extension USB-IF ACD (OID 2.23.145.1.2): Seems to contain static data in an OCTET STRING, which can be added via EJBCA Admin GUI.

Conclusion: EJBCA should be able to issue such certificates.

[1] "USB Authentication Specification Rev. 1.0, March 25, 2016" http://www.usb.org/developers/docs/

Saturday, December 5, 2015

13 Hardcore EJBCA PKI options explained

This blog post is based on my 'Hardcore PKI' presentation at PrimeKey Tech Days 2015. The EJBCA functions described can help you integrate PKI more efficiently for specific use cases.

What is hardcore PKI?

Technologies such as ASN.1 and X.509, RSA and ECC Standards and APIs are extremely complex for most users and developers, and the important process of fitting them all together in standards (to enable interoperable systems) is very hard. However, implementors of PKI systems don't have to care about these hardcore technologies due to a few helpful tools:
  • ASN.1 parsing is done using the library BouncyCastle
  • Digital signatures with RSA and ECC is also done either using BouncyCastle in software, or it is done in Hardware Security Modules.
  • Standardization is done by organizations such as IEFT and Oasis.
When people think about PKI they often think about hardcore technologies, but because of these handy tools, the technologies themselves are not what is hardcore about PKI.

The Devil is in the Detail

Hardcore PKI, in my opinion, is that everybody needs and uses PKI, but always in slightly different ways. This demands from the PKI to have the ability to support a lot of different architectures (which EJBCA does) and from you to be able to configure and fine tune your PKI according to your precise needs. The devil is in the details!
The many possibilities of configuring several details is really the hardcore part in PKI.

Thirteen EJBCA options explained

Here are thirteen examples of hardcore details that can truly make your PKI better integrated. But unless you are looking for one or more of these specific features,  these options may appear somewhat incomprehensible.
One reason for EJBCA to provide all these functions is to support policy enforcement all the way from Complete Enforcement by the CA, to All Enforcement in the RA (where the CA trusts the RA blindly).
On to the details! Most of the options are also described in the EJBCA User Guide.

Permissions
EJBCA Certificate Profile override and certificate storage options
EJBCA Certificate Profile options: override and certificate storage
  • Allow validity override – Normally validity is determined by the certificate profiles, but with this option the validity period can be taken from the request sent by the client/RA.
  • Allow extension override – Normally certificate extensions are determined by the certificate profiles, but with this option the extensions can be taken from the request sent by the client/RA.
  • Allow DN override – Normally the DN is pre-registered and determined by the end entity record, but with this option the DN can be taken from the request sent by the client/RA.
  • Use Certificate storage – An interesting option where you can choose to not store issued certificates in the CA database. This fits specific use cases where revocation never needs to happen and you want to issue large amounts of certificates without the burden of administrating a growing CA database. A kind of fire and forget CA.

Other data
EJBCA Certificate Profile CN postfix and single active certifiate options
EJBCA Certificate Profile options: CN postfix and single active certificate
  • Use CN postfix – tells the CA to add some text after the CN in the issued certificate. Can be used to get user friendly names (like 'Tomas – Encryption' and 'Tomas – Signing') in browser certificate dialogues.
  • Use DN and altName subset – use this if you want to register more information about end entities, than is visible in the issued certificate.
  • Approvals – enforces dual control (or four eyes principle) for certain functions such as revocation and key recovery.
  • Single Active Certificate Constraint – automatically revokes an end entity's old certificate when a new certificate is retrieved. This ensures that a user or device can only use one certificate at a certain point in time.

Directives
EJBCA Certificate Profile enforce public key and DN options
EJBCA Certificate Profile options: enforce public key and DN
  • Enforce unique public keys – makes two end entities unable to use the same public key.
  • Enforce unique DN – makes two end entities unable to share the same subject DN.
  • Enforce unique Subject DN SerialNumber - makes two end entities unable to share the same SerialNumber component in the Subject DN. The SerialNumber in the DN is typically used for device serial numbers, thus ensuring that one device is only registered as a single end entity.
  • Use User Storage – when disabled, end entities are not stored in the database when issuing certificates through an RA capable protocol. Saves space in the database, but removes some functionality.
  • Use Certificate Storage – when disabled, certificates are not stored in the database when issued. This option enables issuing of billions of certificates without using any storage space, but on the other hand disables several of the commonly required PKI functions such as revocation.

The Key Take Aways

All of the obscure functions described above are used in real life, for various use cases. Some very domain specific, some more generic. The key take away, is that these functions provide short-cuts for use cases where you thought you would have to do work-arounds, or be limited by the capabilities of a specific product. With the functions described (and several others) you can integrate PKI in your use case in the most efficient way, only having your imagination setting the boundaries.

EJBCA Enterprise

In EJBCA Enterprise we strive for maximum flexibility, only having a single platform to manage all needs of PKI. This means EJBCA has to be available for all platforms, and be ready to implement many protocols and multiple APIs, while enabling you to use your PKI from many locations. In order to do this we need to support many different PKI architectures (as was explained here).

More information

Basic information on EJBCA Enterprise PKI and PKI Appliance developed by PrimeKey.
EJBCA is a registered trademark of PrimeKey Solutions AB in the EU, the United States, Japan and certain other countries.

Sunday, July 5, 2015

Authenticode Code Signing with SignServer Enterprise

In this blog post we will focus on the support for signing Windows executables with SignServer Enterprise using Authenticode, one of the most popular formats.

Digital Signatures and Central Code Signing

Whenever software is being distributed over the Internet (or other insecure network), or it is stored on untrusted media, it is crucial to use a reliable signing tool to digitally sign all executable files such as applications, libraries and drivers.
Harmful code is today a real threat to users and organizations alike, as criminal groups and even governments use malicious software to steal and monitor data, extort money or empty your bank account.
Digitally signed code ensures that the transferred software is trusted and unmodified. That is, as long as one picks a secure signing tool. Simply setting up any code signing tool you are able to find, may result in an insecure solution that makes you vulnerable to all sorts of attacks. PrimeKey's signing solution SignServer Enterprise, is proven and allows you to keep your code signing keys and certificates secure and audit ready.
Code signing is crucial for distributing code in many systems:
  • Windows executable files, libraries, drivers and updates.
  • Firmware for hardware devices.
  • Mobile apps (Android, iOS)
  • OS X apps, XCode.
  • Java applications (Applets, WebStart, Oracle Java).
  • Plugins and addons in man applications (Mozilla, Firefox, Thunderbird XPI, NetBeans modules etc).
  • Software from repositories for Linux and Apple OS X.

Three good reasons to use Central Signing

Protection of Signing Keys

The primary reason to use a secure, centralized code signing solution, is to keep code signing keys protected. For this purpose, keys are kept securely in a Hardware Security Module (HSM), mitigating the risk of any key being stolen or used illegitimately.

Centralized control

Many organizations have code signing keys and certificates spread out in different departments and with different developers across the organization. Keeping track of where the signature capabilities reside, and who is allowed to sign code on the organization's behalf, quickly becomes difficult or even unmanageable.
With the centralized signing solution the code signing capabilities are easily controlled from a single location, and the risk of code signing keys being lost or stolen is significantly decreased. The more efficient handling lowers the costs and you may even escape from buying code signing certificates for different people.

Policy and Audit compliance

An organization needs to be able to see exactly when, and for what, a particular code signing key (and its certificate) has been used, and there are usually strict policies surrounding how code signing should be done.
Using a central code signing solution makes it easy to achieve and enforce a strict audit record of who signed what. Some organizations demand this because of external audit requirements. While others need it to maintain trust in their brand, where maintaining good policy and audit records assure that the users of their products are not exposed to unnecessary risks of malicious software.

Using SignServer for code signing

SignServer is PrimeKey's code signing solution that helps you to keep secure control of your code signing keys, and also provides a centrally managed and audited single service for all your code signing needs.
SignServer lets different project members or systems authenticate and share the same well protected code signing key and certificate when signing, and at the same time provides audit records of who signed what. For that matter, SignServer can also control individual code signing keys where only one person is granted authorization.
SignServer Enterprise serves most code signing needs using different signers and custom plug-ins, and support for Authenticode was added from SignServer Enterprise 3.6.3. All you need to start signing code is a signature key pair, generated by SignServer, and a code signing certificate, issued by a private CA such as EJBCA or a public CA.

Windows' Authenticode for executable files

Microsoft has specified a format for digital signatures in software binaries called Authenticode. Using Authenticode, the signature is embedded within some type of portable executable (PE) file, typically with file endings like .exe, .dll, .sys and .ocx.
In Windows, after an executable file has been downloaded and is about to be run, a security warning dialog box will appear (see picture below). At this moment the embedded signature has been verified, the code signing certificate has been verified that it was issued by a trusted CA, and the name of the publisher is displayed to the user. The dialog box asks the user to confirm if it is ok to start the application created by that publisher:
Security Warning when running a windows executable that was properly signed.
Do you want to run this file? Publisher: Mozilla Corporation

If the file had not been signed, a different warning would be displayed, asking the user to confirm that the software should be run, even if the publisher is not known:
Security Warning when running a windows executable that was not properly signed.
The publisher could not be verified. Are you sure you want to run this software?
More technical details are available in an Authenticode whitepaper published by Microsoft.

Authenticode in SignServer

Since SignServer Enterprise 3.6.3, there is an Authenticode signer for PE files.
The signer is configured just like any other signer in SignServer. The only special requirement for this signer is to use a code signing certificate.
If your organization already has a CA (for example EJBCA) configured to be trusted by your users, you can use that CA to issue the certificate. Otherwise you could buy a certificate from one of the CAs already trusted by default in Windows.
For testing purposes, and also for test environments in general, you could issue the certificate yourself. Just remember to have the extended key usage “Code Signing” set and that you have to install the CA certificate in your test environment.
You need to install the CA certificate in your test environment and remember to have the extended key usage set to “Code Signing”.
In addition there are a few configuration options that can be applied to specify additional attributes, such as: the name of the application, if time stamping should be used, which service to use etc. Details of configuration options are documented in the SignServer Manual.
After configuring and activating the signer, a user can sign code, for example by using the Generic Signing page, specifying the name of the signer and providing the binary to upload:
SignServer uploadform for files to be signed.
Signer upload form

After submitting the file, the signed version (with the embedded signature) is returned:
Download dialog for download of signed file.
Save signed file

In Windows, the signature attached to a specific file can be manually inspected:
  1. Right click on the file and choose Properties.
  2. Click on the Digital Signatures tab.
  3. Select the signature in the Signatures list and click Details.
Signature details of a signed executable file.
Displaying the signature details on an executable file

Integration

You can use other interfaces of SignServer (such as the web service interface) to integrate code signing with other systems and applications in a completely transparent way.

More information

Basic information on SignServer Enterprise and PrimeKey Code Signing Appliance is available at PrimeKey.

Sunday, April 5, 2015

High Availability for PKI in 8 Simple Steps

PKI Appliance takes HA Clustering to the next level

Historically, setting up and maintaining High Availability (HA) setups for PKI, required a lot of knowledge about the database in use and how it would interact with HA.
Lately, the packaged PKI product PrimeKey PKI Appliance (running EJBCA and/or SignServer), manages to hide the HA complexity and makes HA easy to setup, robust during operation and simple to handle during recovery. Clustering a PKI has never been easier!
On the PKI Appliance we define the meaning of High Availability as being able to keep services running non-stop, with full data integrity for all included applications.

High Availability Fail Scenarios

Real High Availability requires a cluster setup of three nodes. The reasoning here is that in the case of a node failure, the system should continue to operate on its own, without any administrator measures needed.
Hot standby with manual fail-over is a two nodes cluster setup, which to a lesser extent reduces administration efforts for running systems. Here, the assumption is that depending on which node eventually fails, the system either continues to operate or needs to have a button clicked.
A main site hosting two PKI Appliances and a DR site hosting one PKI Appliance.
With its handy instructions and simple web GUI configuration, PrimeKey PKI Appliance makes it possible to quickly set up a cluster for Disaster Recovery (includes a main site and a remote site).

Technical details

High Availability with the PKI Appliance is implemented using database replication between cluster nodes connected within a network. Using active-active cluster technology means that all the nodes can be fully utilized in the cluster setup. The implementation uses regular network connectivity over the application interface for all cluster communication, which means that cluster nodes don’t have to be placed physically close, as long as they have good network connectivity.
The drawback of most cluster technologies, is that a node cannot distinguish between a failure of another node (such as a broken power supply) and disrupted network connectivity (such as a broken network switch). So in order to avoid a situation where cluster nodes start to operate independently and get diverging data sets, a so called split brain, the cluster nodes take a vote and cease to operate unless they are part of the majority of connected nodes. This way there is only a single data set that can be updated at a specific time.
In case of a temporary network failure, disconnected nodes automatically synchronize their data as soon as the network is back, then start to operate again as if nothing had happened.

Howto: Setting up a 2 node cluster (Hot standby with fail-over)

Using the Appliance Web Configurator it's easy to set up a two node cluster in a few easy steps. Setting up a three node PKI cluster (real High Availability) works the same way, and clustering a PKI has never been easier!
  1. Make an installation according to the standard installation procedure on the initial Appliance node.
  2. On the initial node, go to the cluster tab in the Appliance Web Configurator. To start with it shows the Appliance running as a single instance.
    The PrimeKey PKI Appliance Web Configurator showing cluster configuration of a single instance.

  3. Still on the initial node, add a connection (IP address) to where the second node’s application interface will be. The Appliance will now configure the cluster settings and produce a setup bundle for the second node.
  4. Adding a second cluster node IP in the PKI Appliance.
    PKI Appliance cluster configuration going on.
    PKI Appliance cluster configuration completed.

  5. Download the setup bundle for the second node by clicking Create and Download.
    From the first node, downloading the configuration package for the second cluster node.

  6. Factory reset the second node and connect to the Web Configurator.
    PrimeKey PKI Appliance initial screen after Factory Reset.

  7. On the second node, select the Connect to cluster option and upload the setup bundle.
  8. Uploading cluster setup bundle on the PKI Appliance.
    When processing an uploaded cluster setup bundle, a domain master secret must be specified.
    Date and time settings when connecting PKI Appliance cluster node.
    PrimeKey PKI Appliance Cluster configuration preview on second node.
    Ready to begin installation of second Appliance cluster node.

  9. After the installation has been completed, you should be able to manage the new node using the same login credentials as with the first one.
  10. The two nodes are now installed and can be used. Status of the second cluster node shows up as Connected.
  11. PrimeKey PKI Appliance Web Configuration cluster status with two nodes.

More information

Basic information on EJBCA Enterprise PKI and PKI Appliance is available here.
EJBCA is a registered trademark of PrimeKey Solutions AB in the EU, the United States, Japan and certain other countries.